Fields afford and constrain what a thing can do, the capacity of a thing to effectuate its powers, potentialities, or capacities– its affects, in the Spinozist sense of the term –but are also folded into things. We have a tendency to abstract things from the fields in which they dwell, to think them as independent; yet, as I’ve been trying to argue, all things are dividual, rather than individual. The minimal unit of being is not the thing, but the thing and its field. There is no being that is not a being-between, and there is no thing that is not a pleat between thing and field. That’s the working hypothesis, at any rate.
We see this clearly in the case of our own bodies– though perhaps we don’t see it clearly until we’re able to situate our bodies in very different fields. At the naive, common sense level we…
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